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Abstract 
Probabilistic risk assessment is a methodology that can 
be systematically applied to estimate the risk associated 
with the design and operation of complex systems. The 
National Oceanography Centre, Southampton, UK has 
developed a risk management process tailored to the 
operation of autonomous underwater vehicles. Central 
to the application of the risk management process is a 
probabilistic risk assessment. The risk management 
process was applied to estimate the risk associated with 
an Autosub3 science campaign in the Pine Island 
Glacier, Antarctica, and to support decision making. The 
campaign was successful. In this paper we present the 
Autosub3 risk model and we show how this model was 
used to assess the campaign risk.   
 
1. Introduction 
Risk and reliability assessment is an important exercise 
that guides a decision making process in any marine 
science, commercial or military exploration that involves 
the operation of underwater vehicles (AUVs). 
Traditionally, for a given campaign, the risk and 
reliability assessment is carried out by a group of experts 
on-board of the vessel; for example, in a marine science 
campaign the group of experts include science 
managers, engineers and the vessel operator. This 
process is highly subjective and often experts do not 
have access to statistical analysis of historical failure 
data. The National Oceanography Centre, Southampton, 
developed a risk management process tailored to AUV 
operations RMP-AUV1. This process model adds more 
formality to the risk assessment process (Griffiths and 
Trembranis, 2007a). The campaign risk estimation was 
an important factor in the management of Autosub3 
                                                           
1 Webpage: www.noc.soton.ac.uk/nmf/usl/gxg/RMP-AUV.html. 
[Accessed 12 July 2009]. 
operations for the joint UK-US campaign on the RV 
Nathaniel B. Palmer to Pine Island Bay, Antarctica in 
January 2009. 
Autosub3 is an autonomous underwater vehicle 
designed and operated by the National Oceanography 
Centre, Southampton. The vehicle comprises complex 
mechatronics; the loss of a vehicle can be caused by one 
of many factors, for example: human error, environment 
factors and components faults, and these are often 
interrelated. Consequently in order to quantify the 
vehicle’s reliability, we adopted a systems view, where 
faults caused by different sources were used to create a 
risk model for the system operation in four operating 
environments (open water, coastal, sea ice and ice shelf). 
The risk model was defined on the basis of 67 faults that 
emerged in previous Autosub3 operations, and expert 
judgements on the criticality of each fault (Brito, et. al, 
2008). A formal judgment elicitation exercise was 
adopted, where faults were assessed by a group of 10 
independent experts plus 3 internal experts. The experts 
were asked to assign a probability of loss given that a 
fault emerged in one of four possible operating 
environments; the experts were given a fault description 
and mission distance (Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007b). 
This paper briefly discusses the outcomes of the risk 
elicitation exercise. In short we will discuss: 
o Graphical methods used  to remove bias in the risk 
assessment process; 
o Mathematical methods to aggregate expert 
judgments; 
o Analysis of the most critical faults identified by the 
independent experts; 
o A new Kaplan-Meier formulation to estimate AUV 
probability of survival with range. 
Prior to the campaign to the Antarctic, the Principal 
Investigator was asked to provide a list of mission 
descriptions and distances, including distances under ice 
shelf and sea ice.  In addition to quantifying the risk of each of these science missions, the new Kaplan-Meier 
formulation provided very good insight into possible 
mitigation strategies. The new formulation helped to 
devise an optimal monitoring distance for each science 
mission before committing to under ice shelf operation.  
In the actual Pine Island Glacier (PIG) campaign 
Autosub3 carried out eight missions, 427-434. Six of 
these missions were successful science missions, two 
were test missions. Autosub3 covered 510km under the 
ice shelf. Mission 427 was a test mission; in missions 
428, 429 and 430 Autosub3 covered approximately 
180km under the ice shelf as planned. Whilst on mission 
431 Autosub3 suffered a high impact incident when the 
vehicle was 55km into the ice shelf. Autosub3 risk 
model was used to assess the probability of losing the 
vehicle on the two outstanding missions. The risk was 
deemed acceptable and the mission was authorised by 
the responsible owner. Autosub3 survived the recent 
campaign to the PIG. In addition to discussing the risk 
analysis carried prior to the campaign to the Antarctic, 
this paper also reviews the risk assessment carried out 
after mission 431 that enabled the decision to continue 
the campaign.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 
provides a description of the risk management process. 
Section 3 provides a simple statistical analysis of 
Autosub3 failure history. Section 4 describes the formal 
judgment elicitation process followed in order to build 
the risk model. Section 5 gives insight of the graphical 
methods used for studying the expert judgments and 
briefly summarises the outcomes of the analysis. Section 
6 explains how the expert judgments were aggregated. 
Section 7 lists the top critical hazards. Section 8 gives 
details concerning the survival statistical functions used 
to estimate Autosub3 probability of survival with range. 
Section 9 summarises the risk assessment conducted 
prior to the campaign to the PIG. Section 10 describes 
the process followed to update the campaign risk given 
the emergence of a critical fault whilst on mission 431. 
Section 11 provides a discussion of the results and 
highlights the benefits and shortcomings of the risk 
management process.  
 
2. NOCS Risk Management Process 
The NOCS RMP-AUV consists of 11 phases (Griffiths 
and Trembranis, 2007a). The acceptable risk (A) for a 
campaign is set by the AUV responsible owner, at the 
start of the process. This risk is expressed in terms of an 
acceptable probability of losing the vehicle. The 
acceptable risk is calculated based on the capital cost of 
the AUV, costs of operation, and replacement costs. 
The exact way in which these factors are combined to 
derive the acceptable risk is presented in (Griffiths and 
Trembranis, 2007a). In the second phase the campaign 
principal investigator (PI) sets the campaign 
requirements. These are expected to be presented in the 
form of a set of missions, and their distances, for a given 
environment (e.g. open water, coastal water, under sea 
ice or under ice shelf). In the third phase the technical 
team calculates the probability of loss for the proposed 
science campaign. The probability of AUV loss (L)2 is 
calculated for each set of missions. If L is lower than A, 
then the missions set is authorised, otherwise, if L is 
greater than A, then the mission set is not authorised 
and the process directs the group (PI and engineers) to 
go through other phases that will either ensure that the 
missions set is accepted (because key risks were 
mitigated) or in the worst case scenario, it may lead the 
team to the conclusion that the mission set must be 
removed from the science plan.  
The central task in applying the RMP-AUV is to 
determine probability of loss for the proposed science 
campaign, denoted as P(L) from hereafter. In a 
(hypothetical) case where there was a huge sample of 
previous Autosub3 missions in the same environment as 
the environment of the proposed mission, say a huge 
number of operations under ice shelf, with the same 
team, vessel and with the same sea conditions, and when 
vehicles had been lost, it would be possible to determine 
P(L) by simple frequency analysis. However such a 
databank does not exist for Autosub3. Subjectivist 
probability judgments provide a suitable alternative to 
the traditional frequency approach. The probability P(L) 
can be determined by human expert probability 
judgment. This discipline is called Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA). An early application of PRA was to 
estimate the probability of occurrence of major 
accidents in the nuclear industry.  High profile accidents 
such as Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have 
accelerated the development of PRA approaches in this 
industrial sector (Apostolakis and Kafka, 1992).  
 
3. Autosub3 Failure History  
The Autosub3 risk model was designed based on 
experience gathered from 43 missions. Eleven of the 
missions resulted in no fault. The data was collected 
f r o m  f i v e  c a m p a i g n s .  D e t a i l s  o f  e a c h  A u t o s u b 3  
campaign are given below:  
o  Discovery July 2005. AUV and other trials in 
Software approaches. Mission 384 to 387. 
                                                           
2 As denoted in (Griffiths, Trembranis, 2007a). o  Terscheling May 2006 AUVtrials in Software 
approaches. Missions 388 to 389. 
o  Discovery June 2006. Biological measurements in 
NE Atlantic. Missions 400 to 404. 
o  Terschelling July 2006. Turbulence studies in the 
Irish Sea. Missions 405 to 408. 
o  Terschelling March 2007. Deepwater AUV 
reliability proving trials in Norway. Missions 
409 to 422.  
o  Terscheling June 2008. Autosub3 reliability trials. 
Missions 423 to 426. 
Table A.I in the appendix presents a list of missions 
with distances and number of faults.  
The campaigns listed above took place in open water 
environment.   
Figure 1 presents the pareto plot capturing the 
failure modes of Autosub3. Mechanical problems were 
the main cause for failure, they account for 20 instances, 
or approximately 30% (20/67) of all failures. This is in 
contrast to Autosub2 results, where ‘mechanical 
problems’ was the category with the least number of 
entries, 1 entry in 50 faults (2%) of the failures (Griffiths 
et al., 2003).  
Also of interest is the fact that for Autosub3 (see 
Figure 1), the category ‘human error’ is the third (tied 
with ‘bad GPS’’) most significant fault category, it 
accounts for 10% of all causes. For Autosub2, the 
‘human error’ category accounts for 11 entries in 50 
faults (22%) of all causes. This indicates a gain in human 
reliability, which may be explained by the more efficient 
operational practices used by the team.  
It is also worth comparing the number of faults per 
mission and per km travelled for the two vehicles, Table 
I. 
Table I   Faults per mission and per km for Autosub2 and 
Autosub3.  
Parameters Autosub2 Autosub3 
Number of missions  216  42 
Number of faults  50  67 
Number of  km travelled  2125  2184.1 
Number of faults per 
mission 
0.23 
1.60 
Faults per km  0.024  0.031 
Average km per mission  9.84  52.0 
Mean distance between 
fault (MDBF) (km) 
41.7 32.3 
Mean time between fault 
(MTBF)  (hrs) 
7 5.4 
 
The figures for MTBF comparable to those of 
unmanned aircraft vehicles (UAVs) used by the 
American Defence (OSD, 2003). Whilst the RQ-1A 
Predator  presents a high MTBF of 32hrs other AUVs, 
such as RQ-2A Pioneer and the RQ-5 Hunter  have a 
MTBF of 9.1hrs and 11.3hrs respectively.  
The majority of Autosub3 campaigns had the 
purpose of improving the vehicle’s reliability, the vehicle 
was put under severe tests, and thus it is not surprising 
that the number of faults per km has increased from 
Autosub2 to Autosub3.  Of course, these figures do not 
tell us anything about the criticality of these failures.  
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Figure 1   Pareto plot of Autosub3 failure modes for Missions 384-
426. 
4. Formal Judgment Elicitation Process  
The Autosub3 risk model design was based on the 
probabilistic risk assessment provided by human 
experts. Such assessment is not error free. Research has 
shown that humans use mental shortcuts to assign 
probabilities to events, in the literature these are denoted 
as heuristics. Anchoring, representativeness and 
availability are three of the most debated heuristics 
(Tversky and Kuhenemann, 1986). Experts introduce 
biases when following one of these heuristics. It is generally accepted that the most effective way to reduce 
biases is by adopting a formal judgment elicitation 
process (Otway and Winterfeldt, 1992), (Keeney and 
Winterfeldt, 1991). 
The judgements used for building the Autosub3 risk 
model were elicited via a formal judgment elicitation 
process (Griffiths and Trembranis, 2007b). This 
comprises seven sequential phases: 1) Setting out the 
issues; 2) Selecting the experts; 3) Training the experts; 
4) Presenting the issue; 5) Analysis of the judgments; 6) 
Judgments aggregation; and 7) Write-up. Details of the 
results obtained in each phase of the elicitation process 
are given in Brito, Griffiths and Trembranis (2008).  The 
process was inevitably time consuming and researchers 
have been working continuously on developing formal 
judgment elicitation process, that are both effective in 
reducing biases and can also be conducted in a short 
period of time (Griffiths, et al., 2009).  
Table II presents the list of experts that took part in 
the risk assessment exercise for failures that occurred in 
missions 384-422. The experts were chosen for their 
experience in AUV operation. None of the experts 
works or has worked for NOCS. This ensures that there 
is a level of independence between the institution 
operating the vehicle and the experts. Ideally, the same 
experts should have assessed failures that occurred in 
missions 423-426. The judgments provided by the 
independent experts form the large proportion of the 
Autosub3 risk model. The last Autosub3 campaign, on 
board of Terscheling in June 2008, took place after the 
independent expert elicitation exercise. Thus faults that 
occurred on missions 423- 426 were assessed by NOCS 
AUV experts. Details concerning the experience of 
NOCS experts are presented listed in Table III.  
Table II   Experience of experts in EEJ(Annex A) group. 
Experts’ names are abbreviated.  
Expert  Application area  Years of experience 
AS Scientific  research  1.5 
BF Military  8 
CJ  Scientific research and Military  11 
CW Scientific  research  10 
DY Scientific  research  15 
MM Scientific  research  6 
RM Scientific  research  9 
TC  Scientific research, Military and 
Commercial 
20 
Table III   Experience of experts in EEJ (GG, PS, SM) group. 
Experts’ names are abbreviated.  
Expert  Application area  Years of experience 
GG Scientific  research  22 
PS Scientific  research  18 
SM Scientific  research  15 
The experts were asked to answer the following 
question: “What is the probability of loss of the vehicle 
in the given environment E given fault/incident F?”. 
This questionnaire is refereed to as Annex A (Griffiths 
and Trembranis, 2007b). The experts provided 
judgments for all 67 faults.  
5. Analysis of the Expert Judgements  
Two people may have different, and defensible, views 
about the same problem. This is no different when it 
comes to assigning probability to events. Experts may 
disagree on the probability of an event taking place, or, 
in the RMP-AUV case, the probability of a failure 
leading to loss. When there is a huge disagreement 
between experts, rather than dismissing their hypothesis, 
one should try to understand the reason why experts do 
disagree. If both viewpoints are equally valid, the 
statistical model should somehow include both 
judgments.  
In addition to the probability judgments, the experts 
also provided a narrative describing the reasoning in 
support for their judgements. The longitudinal 
distribution of the probability judgments provides a 
good insight as to when experts do disagree with respect 
to the probability judgments. Figure 2 presents the 
longitudinal distribution of the probability judgments, 
for a fraction of failures, in open water environment. A 
full longitudinal probability distribution, for all 
environments, is presented in Annexes D and I of (Brito 
et al., 2009). Fifteen recommendations (four for open 
water environment, two for coastal water, four for sea 
ice and five for ice shelf) were raised in that report.   
The cumulative distribution of an expert’s 
probability judgments provides a visual means to easily 
identify: 1) whether the expert tends to use lower or 
upper probability ranges; 2) how the expert probability 
ranges vary across different environments; and 3) how 
does an expert’s cumulative distribution compares with 
another expert’s cumulative distribution, in terms of 
shape and probability ranges. It was decided to use nine 
classes for probability ranges: [0, 0.0001], [0.0001, 
0.0003], [0.0003, 0.001], [0.001, 0.003], [0.003, 0.01], 
[0.01, 0.03], [0.03, 0.1], [0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 1.0]. This set of 
classes would allow us to capture judgments of all order 
of magnitude. Since that no expert provided judgments 
between 10^-5 and 0, there was no need to create a suc 
a class. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution for 
the frequency in which experts use each class, for sea ice 
environment.  Figure 3 shows that judgements for experts that often 
use lower probability ranges follow a narrow ‘S’ shape, 
whereas the judgments for experts that often use higher 
probability ranges follow a broad ‘S’ shape. This lead to 
the conclusion that, when it comes to assigning 
probability to events, there are two schools of thought, 
the optimists (those experts whose probability 
distributions follow a narrow ‘S’ shape) and the 
pessimists (those experts whose probability distributions 
follow a broad ‘S’ shape).  
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Figure 2   Longitudinal distribution for the probability judgments 
provided for open water.  Only nine failures are presented of a total of 
sixty three. 
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Figure 3 shows that, for sea ice, expert CW does not use 
probability ranges lower than 0.1. CW probability 
judgments exhibit a similar distribution for open water, 
coastal and ice shelf (Brito, et al. 2008). This suggests a 
bias toward much higher risk in this expert’s judgments.  Figure 3   Cumulative distribution of expert judgments over nine 
different ranges. 
In addition to providing insight concerning 
probability ranges used by experts, the analysis carried 
out using the cumulative distribution also highlighted a 
phenomenon that might otherwise be ignored.  
The mean and standard deviation for each expert is 
given in Table IV. 
 
Table IV   Mean and standard deviation for the sixty three judgments provided by each expert. Results are presented for all four 
operating environments: open water, coastal water, sea ice and ice shelf. 
 Experts 
   Adam 
Skarke 
Mark 
Moline 
Barbara 
Fletcher
Clayton 
Jones 
Rob 
McEwen
Chris 
Williams 
Tom 
Curtin 
Dana 
Yoerger 
Mean  0.00210  0.0105 0.0157  0.00284  0.00256  0.0452  0.0215 0.0722  Open water 
Std Dev  0.00638  0.0211  0.0173  0.00875  0.00642  0.104  0.101  0.0704 
Mean  0.0113 0.0257 0.0157  0.00313  0.00625  0.0313  0.0214 0.0984  Coastal water 
Std  Dev 0.0331 0.0506 0.0174  0.00884  0.0106  0.0322  0.0893 0.111 
Mean  0.0179  0.116 0.0513 0.0166  0.282  0.0778  0.111 0.229  Sea ice 
Std Dev  0.0357  0.0917  0.0532  0.0381  0.232  0.0745  0.239  0.219 
Mean  0.2486  0.355 0.0720 0.0706  0.393  0.337  0.203 0.371  Ice shelf 
Std  Dev  0.301 0.346 0.101  0.168 0.324  0.421  0.325 0.394 
 6. Aggregating Expert Judgements  
Once the expert judgments have been studied for 
discrepancies and misunderstandings, the next step is to 
aggregate the expert judgments. The end result of 
judgment aggregation is a single probability judgment 
for each failure or incident.   
Expert judgment aggregation is an active research 
field for social scientists and cognitive psychologists. 
Expert judgments can be aggregated in a mathematical 
or a behavioural fashion (Winkler, 1968), (Clemen and 
Winkler, 1999). As the name indicates, mathematical 
aggregation methods use mathematical formulations to 
analytically aggregate individually elicited expert 
judgments . For behavioural aggregation methods on the 
other hand, experts are supposed to be in the same 
room and they are supposed to agree on the final 
judgments. The risk model presented in this paper was 
created based on the linear opinion pool mathematical 
aggregation method:  
 




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n
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1
1
    1. 
The linear opinion pool was used to create two models 
per environment (one optimistic and one pessimistic). 
Table II lists the experts used by each model.  
 
Table V   Judgments used for the risk model, for four 
environments. 
Model Experts 
Optimist  MM,CJ,RM,TC and AS 
Open water  Pessimist  BF, CW and DY 
Optimist  AS, CJ, RM and TC 
Coastal  Pessimist  BF, MM, CW and DY 
Optimist  TC, CJ and AS 
Sea ice  Pessimist  MM,BF, RM, CW and DY 
Optimist  CJ and TC 
Ice shelf  Pessimist AS,MM,BF,RM,CW  and 
DY 
 
7. Most Critical Failures for Ice shelf 
Environment  
When possible, risk mitigation can be achieved by 
removing failures, or hazards, from the system. This 
could be a result of design improvements or of 
optimisation of operation practices. The top five critical 
failures for under ice shelf operations are listed in Tables 
V and VI, the first for the optimistic and the second for 
the pessimistic experts. 
Table V   Top five critical failures for ice shelf environment. 
Optimistic model, missions 384-422. The aggregated 
probability of loss is in bold and italic.  
Mission Fault  description 
395_1_1 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped around the 
propulsion motor and jammed.   0.9786 
402_1_5  Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 20h into 
mission. Stern plane actuator had flooded.   0.8929 
402_2_5 Abort due to network failure. Abort release could not 
communicate with depth control node for 403s. Possibly 
side-effect of actuator or motor problems.  0.7333 
385_1_1 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, due to a side 
effect of the removal of the upwards-looking ADCP. 
0.6500 
415_1_3  Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for this 
new design of actuator motor and gearbox. However, AUV 
spent most of mission “stuck” going around in circles at 
depth due to rudder actuator fault. The new actuator 
overheated, melting wires internally, the motor seized, and 
internal to the main pressure case, the power filter 
overheated. Some of the damage may have been caused by an 
excessive current limit (3A); correct setting was 0.3A. But 
this does not explain high motor current. Possible damage 
during testing when motor stalled on end stop? Compounded 
by wiring to motor held tightly to case with cable ties, and 
worse, covered with tape (acting as an insulator). Wires were 
not high temperature rated.  0.4143 
Table VI   Top five critical failures for ice shelf environment. 
Pessimistic model, missions 384-422. The aggregated 
probability of loss is in bold and italic. 
Mission Fault  description 
384_1_2 Mission aborted (to surface) due to network failure. (Much) 
later tests showed general problem with the harnesses (bad 
crimp joints).   0.8389 
395_1_1 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped around the 
propulsion motor and jammed.   0.8293 
385_1_1 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, due to a side 
effect of the removal of the upwards-looking ADCP.   
0.7842 
402_2_5 Abort due to network failure. Abort release could not 
communicate with depth control node for 403s. Possibly 
side-effect of actuator or motor problems.  0.7611 
402_3_5 Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to case. 
Propeller speed dropping off gradually during a dive. 
0.7250 
The probability judgments for failures that occurred in 
missions 423-426 were provided by NOCS’ AUV experts. The judgements were aggregated using the 
linear opinion pool. A list of the top critical failures for 
these missions and the respective judgments is presented 
in Table VII. 
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Table VII   Top five critical failures for ice shelf environment. 
Pessimistic model, missions 423-424. The aggregated 
probability of loss is in bold and italic. The same judgment was 
provided for optimistic and pessimistic model. 
Mission Fault 
no. 
Aggregated judgment on the 
probability of loss 
   Open 
water 
Coastal Sea  ice  Ice 
shelf 
423 1  0.01 0.01  0.003  0.001 
423 2  0.01 0.01  0.003  0.001 
424 1  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
426 1  0.001 0.001  0.05  0.67 
 
8. Survival Statistics  
Simple statistics such as those presented in section 3 are 
useful for describing the vehicle’s performance and to 
help in setting long term reliability targets. However, 
such statistics, alone, are not sufficient for supporting 
operational risk management. Operational risk 
management is better supported by the use of survival 
statistics (Griffiths, et al., 2003). Survival statistical 
functions can be used to estimate the AUV probability 
o f  s u r v i v a l  w i t h  t i m e  o r  with range, as the two are 
dependent range will be used hereafter. Survival 
statistical methods can be either parametric or non 
parametric. In order to apply a parametric survival 
function one needs to: first define a lifetime table; and 
second, fit a parametric function such as Weibull to the 
data on the lifetime table. Non-parametric survival 
models do not make any assumption with regard to the 
shape of the survival function, they use analytical 
methods to manipulate the data (Kalbfleisch, 1980), 
(Kaplan and Meier, 1958). 
The Autosub3 probability of survival with range was 
obtained using an extended version of the Kaplan Meier 
estimator:  
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S is the probability of survival; r the range in km; ni is the 
fault index and P(ei) is the probability of loss. 
The Kaplan Meier survival distribution for ice shelf 
is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4   Kaplan Meier survival distribution for ice shelf 
environment. Optimistic model, missions 384-422. 
 
The shape of the Kaplan Meier survival distribution 
is similar for all environments, but as predicted, the 
steps are smaller for more benign environments, e.g., 
open water, coastal and sea ice.  
The figure shows that there is a steep decrease in 
probability of survival (approximately 0.1) in the first 
30km, which is followed by a stretch of approximately 
70km where the probability of survival decreases 0.02.  
In practical terms this means that if one manages to 
monitor the vehicle for the first 30 km, then the 
probability of surviving the first 70km under an ice shelf 
is approximately 0.98, given that it has survived the first 
30km.  
The use of a monitoring distance provides means for 
reducing the probability of losing the vehicle to 
acceptable levels. The condition probability function 
presented in [3] was used to accurately quantify the gain 
in probability of survival: 
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       3. where the expression to the left represents the 
probability of surviving distance X given that it has 
survived distance Y.  F(x) is the probability of surviving 
distance X and F(y) stands for the probability of 
surviving distance y.  
The conditional probability expression in [3] is not 
suitable for calculating the gain in probability of survival 
when this probability of survival is expressed in the 
Kaplan Meier form as a step function.  The reason for 
this is because for most situations F(x) equals F(y) and 
therefore the gain in probability of survival is calculated 
to be zero, which is not the case. Thus a different 
survival function had to be used; this survival function 
would have to allow the quantification of gain in 
probability of survival given that a monitoring distance 
was introduced. The Weibull survival function meets 
this requirement (Brito et al., 2008).  
The following two sections show how this approach 
was used to mitigate the risk of loosing Autosub3 in the 
campaign to the Pine Island Glacier.  
 
9. Pine Island Glacier, Antarctica: Pre-
Campaign Risk Assessment 
 
9.1 Purpose of the Campaign 
The main goal of the campaign was to gather data that 
would help determine how the warm Circumpolar Deep 
Water (CDW) gets beneath the glacier and how it 
determines the rate at which the glacier melts. Three 
subsidiary objectives had to be met: 1) map the seabed 
beneath the glacier; 2) map the underside of the glacier; 
3) and determine where and how heat is transferred 
from the inflowing CDW to the outflowing ice-ocean 
boundary layer. 
Figure 5 shows the track chart of Autosub3 mission 
434 superimposed on a satellite image of the glacier. The 
original plan was to send the AUV on six missions, three 
30km under the ice shelf and three 60kms under the ice 
shelf.   
The planning for waypoints and profiles was guided 
by a combination of data, which included: ice thickness 
collected by radar sounding, sea bed soundings from 
cruise NBP0402, and multi-beam data collected over the 
course of NBP0901 from seaward of the glacier. It was 
originally assumed that the sea bed was fairly flat.  
 
 
Figure 5   Autsub3 Mission 434.  Autosub3 went 45km into ice, 
turned south for 10km at 200m altitude then return to turn point at 
100m altitude, then went north for 10km at 100m altitude, returned to 
turn point at 200m then returned to safe way point profiling from 500 
to 900m depth. 
 
9.2 Operational Requirements 
The campaign requirements for Autosub3 were set by 
the Principal Investigator, Dr. Adrian Jenkins, British 
Antarctic Survey (BAS) (Jenkins, 2007). 
Dr. Jenkins provided the minimum and the desirable set 
of missions. These missions consisted of a combination 
of several open water and under sea ice missions in the 
Amundsen Sea and ice shelf missions under Pine Island 
Bay glacier. A brief description of the requirements for 
each mission set is given below:  
 Scenario 1 – Minimum set with no fast ice: 1) Three 60 
km open water missions and 2) Three 60 km missions 
under outer half of the ice shelf cavity. 
 Scenario 2 – Minimum set with fast ice: 1) Three 120 
km under fast ice missions; and 2) Three 120 km 
missions: 60 km under fast ice and 60 km under outer 
half of the ice shelf cavity. 
 Scenario 3 – Desirable set with no sea ice: 1) Three 60 
km open water missions; 2) Three 60 km missions 
under outer half of the ice shelf cavity; and 3) Three 
120 km missions under ice shelf cavity. 
 Scenario 4 – Desirable set with fast ice: 1)Three 120 km 
under fast ice missions; 2) Three 120 km missions: 60 
km under fast ice and 60 km under outer half of the ice shelf cavity; and 3) Three 180 km missions: 60 km 
under fast ice and 120 km under ice shelf cavity. 
Scenario 1 and 3 consider that there is no sea ice in front 
of the glacier; this would be the ideal scenario.  However 
it is also possible to encounter sea ice in front of the 
glacier, scenarios 2 and 4 were introduced to capture 
this, more likely, scenario.  
The Autosub3’s responsible owner, the NOCS 
Director, was asked to define an acceptable probability 
of loss for each mission set. The figures provided by the 
Director were as follows: 1) Scenario 1: A = 0.1; 2) 
Scenario 2: A = 0.17; 3) Scenario 3: A = 0.20 ; and 4) 
Scenario 4: A = 0.23. Based on the risk analysis 
scenarios 1-4 must be less than the acceptable 
probability of loss defined by the Director. 
 
9.3 Risk Assessment 
The Kaplan Meier survival function was used for 
estimating the probability of Autosub3 surviving the 
campaign to the Antarctica. The probability of losing the 
vehicle was calculated for all four scenarios.  Table VIII 
provides a summary of the results.  
 
Table VIII    Probability of losing Autosub3 based on Kaplan 
Meier estimator (first row) and based on Weibull function 
(second row). Optimistic on the left and pessimistic on the 
right. No monitoring distance mitigation is considered. 
Estimator 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
K-M  0.26 - 0.56 0.40 - 0.81 0.53 - 0.86 0.64 - 0.96
Weibull  0.29 - 0.63 0.47 - 0.85 0.57 - 0.90 0.72 - 0.97
 
The initial risk estimates were deemed too high for the 
campaign. The calculated risk for all scenarios exceeded 
the accept risk level defined by the NOCS Director. 
Thus, the subsequent analysis aimed at finding risk 
mitigation strategies. The following two actions were 
taken in order to mitigate the risk: 
1.  Re-design of the servo-actuator that caused 
fault in mission 402. This fault has been 
completely understood and removed from the 
system. Judgments for faults in mission 402 
were therefore removed from the database. 
2.   Introduction of a monitoring distance.  
The risk assessment presented in this section was 
conducted prior to the Autosub3 campaign to Norway.  
It was assumed that the Autosub3 would survive 10 
missions of 5km range, with no faults.   
Our analysis showed that the campaign risk would meet 
the Director requirements if a monitoring distance of 
28km was set for scenario 1, 33km for scenario 2, 43 km 
for scenario 3 and 48km for scenario 4.  
 
10. Pine Island Glacier, Antarctica: Post-
Campaign Risk Assessment 
10.1 Vehicle Configuration  
A detailed description of Autosub3 is given elsewhere in 
the literature (Stevenson et. al, 2003), (Pebody, 2008). In 
brief, Autosub3 is a 6.7m long autonomous underwater 
vehicle (AUV). The vehicle is 0.9m diameter and it 
weights 3.6 tonnes, has an operating depth of 1600m 
and a range of 400km at a forward speed of 1.7ms-1. 
Figure 6 depicts Autosub3 whilst in the container. 
 
 
 
Figure 6   Autosub3 getting reading for mission 432, under the Pine 
Island Glacier 
The vehicle structure is divided in three main sections. 
The front section houses most of the science sensors, 
the middle section houses the alkaline batteries and the 
rear section houses the motor controls and other 
systems for the navigation of the vehicle. In order to carry out this campaign the vehicle was fitted 
with a special suite of sensors, the vehicle payload 
included: Sea bird CTD, with dual C and T sensors plus 
dissolved oxygen sensor and transmissometer; 
Kongsberg EM2000 multi-beam echo-sounder; upward-
looking Teledyne RDI 300 kHz ADCP; downward 
looking Teledyne RDI 150 kHz ADCP. 
 
10.2 Missions 427-430 
On arrival at Pine Island Bay there was, unusually, no 
sea ice present, and the decision was to run scenario 1 
followed by the remaining missions to give the desirable 
set, scenario 3. 
Mission 427. This was a test mission. Autosub reached a 
maximum depth of 836m and it travelled approximately 
37.5km. Minor failures were discovered, such as the 
CTD appeared intermittent. Corrective actions were 
taken to address these minor faults. Figure 7 presents an 
overview of mission 327’s track.  
 
 
 
Figure 7   Overview of Autosub3 mission 427. The starting point and 
the ending point are superimposed. Coordinates for the starting point 
were (-74.9164 lat, -102.3671 long); the coordinates for the ending 
point were (-74.9179 lat, -102.3737 long). 
 
Mission 428. First under the ice shelf mission. The 
mission started with a 2hrs test mission, followed by 
data retrieval and checking. Autosub3 took 
approximately 18.4 hrs to cover 101 km, 60km under 
ice-shelf (30km on the way into the cavity plus 30km on 
the way out of the cavity). The AUV run into the ice 
shelf at 200 m constant altitude, then turn and 100 m up 
altitude.  
Figure 8 depicts the path taken by Autosub3 during 
this mission.  Missions 429 and 430 were similar in the 
sense that that same distance was covered under the ice 
shelf and the same altitude was set for different phases 
of the mission. On mission 429, Autosub3 took 21hrs to 
cover 113 km and in mission 430 Autosub3 covered 107 
km in 19hrs.  All missions were successful, and 
Autosub3 collected good data. Figure 8 provides a 3D 
plot of Autsoub3 trajectory for mission 428.  
 
Figure 8   Overview of Autosub3 mission 428. The starting point is in 
green, and the ending point is in red. Coordinates for the starting point 
were (-74.9950 lat, -101.8029 long); the coordinates for the ending 
point were (-75.0364 lat, -102.0086 long). 
 
10.3    Mission 431  
Mission 431 was intended to be the first mission of the 
second set of missions in Dr. Jenkins scenario 3. A 
description is given below: 
 
Mission 431. Fourth under ice shelf run. The objective 
was to run 60km into the glacier at 100m altitude, turn 
when reached position or collision avoided. The AUV 
travelled for approximately 183km and reached a 
maximum depth of 978m. However, the mission was 
aborted 55km from the ice shelf edge. The mission 
terminated early due to the emergency exception being 
called (failed collision avoidance). The vehicle suffered 
structural damage due to collision with ice but managed 
to navigate its way to the rendezvous point in open 
water. The damaged was caused to the Port CTD 
plumbing; and to the Linkquest transducer bulkhead 
connector (the telemetry system was working properly 
on recovery).  
  
 
Figure 9   Autosub3 post mission 431. Damage to the nose is visible 
on the left hand side of Autosub3.  Courtesy of Mr. Steve McPhail 
(NOCS). 
 
10.4    Updated Science Requirement  
During mission 431, Autosub3 discovered a substantial 
transverse ridge, ridge some 300m high. This was an 
important discovery for glaciology and oceanography 
under the ice sheet. As a result two missions were 
requested by the PI to further study the characteristics 
of this ridge.  
The following two missions were requested, as the 30km 
missions turned around before the ridge was fully 
delineated: 
1.  A run on the north side of the cavity to ~50km 
from the ice edge, not attempting to get near the 
grounding line, the end point determined by 
waypoint, with the back up of a water cavity 
thickness parameter. This run would use bottom 
track in and out, ice track would not be called for. 
But, if the water cavity thickness limit was reached 
before the waypoint specified, this would require 
the upward ADCP to be working correctly. Under 
ice distance would be ~100km. 
2.  A run in of ~30km to the ridge crest then a 
transverse run of ~30km followed by a ~30km run 
out, all in bottom track. Under ice distance would 
be ~100km. 
10.5    Updated Risk Assessment  
The collision on mission 431 presented a huge problem 
to the science campaign. The failure was fixable and 
damaged components were easily replaced. However 
given that Autosub2 was lost under the Fimbulisen in 
2005, given the high risk of the operation and given the 
importance of the new discovery, the research team 
faced a dilemma; should the campaign pursue the 
remaining missions or should the campaign be 
interrupted. This called for re-assessment of the risk. 
Three NOCS experts (details of whom are present in 
Table III) provided judgments for faults on missions 
429 and 431, these judgments were aggregated based on 
averaging. A summary of the results is presented in table 
IX.   
Table IX   Risk Assessment conducted by NOCS experts on 
faults that emerged in missions 427-431.  Missions where there 
have been no faults have been censored. 
Mission Fault 
no. 
Aggregated judgment on the 
probability of loss  
427 0  0 
428 0  0 
429 1  0.01 
430 0  0 
431 1  0.58 
 
These judgments were added to the risk model. The 
Weibull survival distribution  
 
Figure 10   Weibull survival distribution of the updated risk model. 
With a scale parameter of 3055 and a shape parameter of 0.5716. Using the Weibull survival function presented in Figure 
10, it was estimated that the risk of loss on each of the 
missions outlined in 10.4 was ~5% based on a distance 
of 100km under shelf ice and a monitoring distance of 
48km. The risk of loss for the two missions being 9%. 
 
10.6 Missions 432-434 
Following the risk assessment presented in the previous 
section, the NOCS Director decided to authorise the 
proposed new set of missions. The text below gives a 
brief description of these missions. 
Mission 432. Post-collision test mission. The vehicle 
covered 27.2km and reached a maximum depth of 
888m. No failures noted. Figure 11 presents an overview 
of the mission. 
 
Figure 11   Overview of Autosub3 mission 432. The starting point is 
in green, and the ending point is in red. Coordinates for the starting 
point were (-74.9637 lat, -101.9238 long); the coordinates for the 
ending point were (-74.9644 lat, -101.8672 long).  
 
Mission 433. Successful science mission. The vehicle 
travelled 157km; it reached a maximum depth of 903m. 
Autosub3 went 55km into ice shelf at 100 m altitude. 
Turn on minimum headroom setting. Profile out the last 
30 km.  
Mission 434. Successful science mission. The vehicle 
travelled  167 km: 45km into ice, turn south for 10km at 
200m altitude then return to turn point at 100m altitude, 
then go north for 10km at 100m altitude, return to turn 
point at 200m then return to safe way point profiling 
from 500 to 900m depth. Battery changed pre mission.  
 
 11. Discussion  
The NOCS risk management process tailored for AUV 
operations was successfully applied to estimate the risk 
of an Autosub3 science campaign to the Pine Island 
Glacier, Antarctica.   
The risk model was developed based on expert 
judgments on the probability of a fault leading to AUV 
loss. A total of 69 faults were considered by the experts. 
The independent experts provided judgments for 63 
faults (92% of all faults). NOCS AUV experts provided 
judgments for 6 faults (8% of all faults).  
Autosub3 survived the mission to the PIG because 
of its good reliability, which is a result of many years 
constant improvement of its design and operational 
processes. However, if one does not know how reliable 
the vehicle is, one is in a vulnerable position where it 
would be a guess as to whether or not the vehicle would 
survive a mission or a campaign. 
Often the task of risk assessment has a negative 
connotation; the general impression is that the risk 
exercise is typically conducted to support an argument 
that will stop a mission or activity from taking place. 
Here we showed how the risk model can be used for 
building an argument in favour of a mission or a 
deployment. So it stops being a case of avoiding risks 
and it becomes more the case of choosing between 
risks. The RMV-AUV uses risk quantification to enable 
rational decision making.  
The risk assessment should be conducted well 
before the start of the campaign; this was the case for 
our initial assessment. However, once the risk model has 
been set up it can be systematically applied to support 
real time decisions. This is the huge benefit of this 
approach. When operating in extreme environments it is 
not unusual for the environment or other circumstances 
to change. A flexible risk assessment approach should 
be able to update the risk estimates whenever this is the 
case. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1    Autosub3 failure history. A detailed failure 
description is given in (Brito, Griffiths and Trembranis, 2008). 
Mission Distance 
(km) 
Number of 
Failures 
384 1.5  2 
385 15.2  1 
386 26  1 
387 27.2  1 
388 0.5  2 
389 3  3 
390 10  0 
391 31  3 
392 32  1 
393 5  1 
394 3  1 
395 8  1 
396 4  1 
397 4  1 
398 8  1 
399 7  0 
400 4  0 
401 7.5  2 
402 274  5 
403 140  3 
404 75  7 
405 2.5  2 
406 104  7 
407 204  2 
408 302.5  5 
409 1.5  1 
410 9  1 
411 128  1 
412 270  2 
413 0.2  0 
414 7  0 
415 6  3 
416 18  1 
417 80  0 
418 15  1 
419 80  0 
420 8  0 
421 9  0 
422 4  0 
423 0.5  2 
424 181  1 
425 53  0 
426 15  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1    Fault description for missions M423, M424, 
426. Terscheling July 2009. 
Mission Fault 
no. 
Description 
423  1  Logger – LonWorks Interface card. 
The failed to start properly pre 
missions 423. The system reported 
problems with the (LonWorks) 
network card interface. Following 
discussions with James Perrett, who 
remembered similar problems with 
Autosub2, we increased the supply 
voltage of the logger from 4.97 volts 
to 5.1 volts, by means of a potential 
divider from the supply to the 
sense+ line on the SMPS. Also 
increased the power supply 
capacitance from 470 to 2000 mF.   
423  2  Autosub WiFi Access Point failed to 
connect. Despite a strong signal, the 
Netgear Access point in the AUV 
was unable to connect to the 
network at the end of mission 424. 
Cured by using the Netgear 
configuration utility, and setting the 
“Country” to “Canada”, and then 
back to “Europe”. This has the effect 
of resetting the access point, after 
which it connects normally.  
424  1  GPS receiver fault. Following pre 
launch checks (M423), the AUV GPS 
receiver failed to get GPS fixes.  Two 
other antennae were tried with no 
success.  During the trails, with little 
spare time, we decided to work 
around this problem by sending the 
AUV its position through the WiFi 
radio. 
426  1  On Mission 426, the mission stopped 
prematurely after 3 hours running 
time. The “Mission Timer” had been 
set at 3 hours by the configuration 
tool.  It should have been 
(automatically) set to the release 
abort system time of 14 hours. This 
is a serious vulnerability in the 
configuration tool. It seems likely 
that best action is to remove the 
timer from the mission control 
system. 
 
 
 
 